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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
* in any respect participate in the violation of this Chapter, may
. . . [have] the said property . . . released by the collector and
delivered to him .. "
The majority on rehearing construed this language just
quoted to refer to and embrace the types of vehicles mentioned
in Section 863 which are used to transport untaxed goods, as well
as the goods themselves, mentioned in Section 865. Justice Haw-
thorne in his dissenting opinion expressed the view that the
provisions of Section 866 applied only to the contraband goods
themselves, seizure of which is authorized by the next preceding
section, and did not refer back to Section 863. Justice Moise did
not express himself on the point, though voting to sustain the
forfeiture.
The question is not free from doubt and while neither the
majority nor the dissent make a completely persuasive case, it
is suggested that the result may be sustained on the general
theory that penal and forfeiture provisions are to be strictly
construed.
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J. Denson Smith*
It seems clear that our ideas about insurance and its im-
portance as an instrumentality of considerable social conse-
quence for protecting the individual against personal loss have
expanded a great deal over the past thirty years. That many
years ago when an automobile tipped over and its side struck
the road violently, the accident was held not to constitute a
"collision." In January of this year when the right rear dual
wheels of a dump truck came off while being driven and the
rear portion of the body struck the roadway violently, the ac-
cident was held to constitute a "collision." Justices LeBlanc and
Hamiter disagreed. Perhaps insurers may not try to do anything
about it, but if they feel so inclined, they can pursue the will-
o'-the-wisp beckoning in the suggestion, "if [the insurer] had
desired to circumscribe its liability to certain specified types of
collisions, it could have spelled out such restrictive coverage
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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in its policy."' The earlier case, although not overruled, was
frowned upon, and not covertly. The court observed that there
was no provision covering "upset" in the earlier policy, yet it
did not, for obvious reasons, find an "upset" within the coverage
of the instant policy. Did the court mean to suggest that if the
present policy had not covered an "upset" the accident here
would not have been a "collision"? If what happened here was
a "collision" then it would seem that the "upset" coverage would
become meaningless. The case was Albritton v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co.2
The plaintiff in Lloyd v. Unity Life Ins. Co.8 relied on a
claimed ambiguity to recover under two policies covering death
by accidental means. The insured had been killed by another
who had pleaded guilty to manslaughter. The court found that
this constituted homicide within an exclusion in the policy ex-
cepting death resulting directly or indirectly from "homicide."
The case of Mouton v. Motors Ins. Corp.4 established the
proposition that where an insurer in an effort to cause needed
repairs to be made to the insured automobile falls down so com-
pletely in the undertaking that major repairs are yet necessary,
the insured is not required to return the car for further repairs
but may recover the cost thereof. The principle involves, of course,
a matter of degree. It will not control where only minor adjust-
ments are needed. Practically considered, the ruling may work
a hardship on the insurer who would perhaps be in a position
to require the original repairer to do the corrective work either
under the original contract or at a minimum additional cost. On
the other hand, it does give better protection to the insured and
constitutes a sound warning to insurers not to treat too lightly
their undertaking to make repairs in cases of this kind.
In Guin v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co.5 the court sustained
the validity of a clause limiting the liability of the insurer in an
automobile fire policy in the event the insured carried other
insurance against the same loss. It rejected the insurer's conten-
tion that the hazard was increased by the additional insurance,
in view of the fact that the insured would be entitled to recover
only once. Its allowance of attorney's fees against one of the
1. Albritton v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 24 La. 522, 529, 70 So.2d 111,
113 (1953).
2. 224 La. 522, 70 So.2d 111 (1953).
3. 225 La. 585, 73 So.2d 470 (1954).
4. 224 La. 879, 71 So.2d 313 (1954).
5. 224 La. 44, 68 So.2d 752 (1953).
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insurers drew a dissent by two of the Justices who felt that a
good faith effort had been made to settle the claim. The case
will warn any insurer not to urge arson as a defense and then
make no effort to prove it.
In LeBreton v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co.,6 an insured, a naval
reserve officer, while on an authorized flight as part of his cross-
country training, was killed when the plane crashed. The claim-
ant's effort to establish that the deceased was not at the time a
"member of the crew" so as to avoid the application of a provision
limiting coverage, was found without merit by the court in a
well-reasoned opinion.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
Paul M. Hebert*
Fidelity National Bank of Baton Rouge v. Vucil was an im-
portant decision clarifying the legal remedy available to an
endorsee bank which cashes a check for a customer who has taken
the check under a forged or unauthorized endorsement. Six
checks drawn on out-of-state banks were remitted by the drawers
to the payee in settlement of various invoices. An employee of
the payee forged the payee's endorsement and, without author-
ity, cashed the checks with the defendant, a bookmaker. The
proceeds were lost in gambling at defendant's establishment
and no portion was received by the payee. The defendant en-
dorsed each check, presented the same to the plaintiff bank and
the bank paid the sum represented by the checks to the defen-
dant. The plaintiff bank was in good faith and knew nothing of
the circumstances that resulted in defendant's lack of title.
Under the usual guaranty of all prior endorsements, the checks
were duly forwarded to the six out-of-state drawee banks which,
upon presentation, paid the items and debited the account of
the drawers. When the forgery was discovered, each of the six
drawee banks made demand upon plaintiff bank for reimburse-
ment under the guaranty of prior endorsements. The plaintiff
bank did not reimburse the drawee banks, but the checks were
relinquished to the plaintiff for the purpose of supporting the
bank's action against the defendant for recovery of the proceeds.
The court sustained the plaintiff bank's action on the theory of
6. 223 La. 984, 67 So.2d 565 (1953).
* Dean and Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 224 La. 124, 68 So.2d 781 (1953).
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